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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 20-1224 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  KAREEM SAMPSON,  
     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petitioner’s application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244  
and 2255(h) to file a second or successive motion to  
vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, related to  
E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cr-00394 before the Honorable  
Cynthia M. Rufe, District Judge 
 
 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 25, 2020) 
______________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
 
 
Kareem Sampson, Appellant Pro Se 
P.O. Box 5000 
Greenville, IL, 62246 
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PER CURIAM 
 Kareem Sampson has filed an application pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h) seeking permission to file a 
second or successive § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or 
correct his federal sentence.  For the reasons below, we will 
deny the application.1 
In 2014, Sampson pleaded guilty in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to 
possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).  His plea agreement included a waiver of his 
right to appeal and limited any collateral challenge to claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The District Court 
denied his subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.  On direct appeal, we 
concluded that Sampson knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to appeal his guilty plea and that enforcement of that 
waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice.  United 
States v. Sampson, 684 F. App’x 177 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Sampson then filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
In April 2019, the District Court denied the motion, 
concluding that his § 2255 claims were waived or meritless.  
Sampson asserts that he had not received the order denying 
his § 2255 motion when he filed a motion to amend his 
 
1 Although we are directed to rule on an application 
like Sampson’s within thirty days of its filing, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(D), the time limit is advisory and not 
mandatory.  See In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 307 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
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§ 2255 motion in September 2019.  After learning that his 
§ 2255 motion had been denied, Sampson filed this 
application.   
Because Sampson’s prior § 2255 motion was denied 
on the merits, he needs our permission to file a second or 
successive § 2255 motion.  See United States v. Roberson, 
194 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 1999).  To obtain our certification, 
Sampson must show that his proposed § 2255 motion 
contains:  “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and 
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty 
of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court, that was previously unavailable.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h).   An applicant must make a prima facie showing 
that these requirements are met.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(C); In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 306-07 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
We understand Sampson to be invoking § 2255(h)(2), 
as he does not discuss any new evidence and seeks to bring a 
claim based on the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Rehaif 
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).  Thus, Sampson 
must show that his proposed claim relies on a new rule of 
constitutional law, that this law has been made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, and that the 
claim was not previously available.  See Tyler v. Cain, 533 
U.S. 656, 662 (2001). 
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In Rehaif, the defendant, like Sampson, was charged 
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Both were prohibited from 
possessing guns, Rehaif as an alien unlawfully in the United 
States, see § 922(g)(5)(A), and Sampson as one who had been 
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in 
prison.  See § 922(g)(1).  The trial court in Rehaif had 
instructed the jury that the Government did not need to prove 
that Rehaif knew that he belonged to the relevant class of 
persons barred from possessing firearms, i.e., that he was an 
alien unlawfully in the United States.  Id. at 2194.  The 
Supreme Court held, however, that the Government must 
prove that a defendant charged with violating § 922(g) knew 
both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the 
relevant class of persons barred from possessing a firearm.  
Id. at 2200.   
Sampson’s claim fails to meet the standard for 
certification of a second or successive § 2255 motion.  First 
and foremost, Rehaif did not state a rule of constitutional law 
at all.  Rather, it addressed what the statutes enacted by 
Congress require for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) 
and 924(a)(2).  Specifically, Rehaif addressed what it means 
for someone to have “knowingly” violated § 922(g).2  Id. at 
 
2 We note that Sampson’s application suggests he may 
misapprehend Rehaif’s rule.  At times, anyway, he argues that 
he did not know that he possessed a firearm because it was 
found under the seat in his girlfriend’s car, which he was 
driving.  As noted above, the Court in Rehaif was concerned 
about whether the defendant knew that he belonged to the 
relevant class of persons barred from firearm possession.  At 
the time of Sampson’s guilty plea, the Government was 
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2195-96.  At all events, it did not set forth a new rule of 
constitutional law as contemplated by § 2255(h).  See In re 
Palacios, 931 F.3d 1314, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) 
(concluding that Rehaif construed the text of § 922(g) to 
mean that “the government must prove that the defendant 
knew he violated each of the material elements of § 922(g).”).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court mentioned the Constitution only 
once in the opinion announcing its decision and that mention 
came when the Court was explaining why the word 
“knowingly” in the statute did not modify the statute’s 
jurisdictional element.  Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2196.  Sampson 
asserts that the Supreme Court in Rehaif overturned a long-
established interpretation of an important criminal statute.  
That may be, see id. at 2201 (Alito, J. dissenting), but that 
does not transform its decision into a rule of constitutional 
law.3   
 
already required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Sampson knowingly possessed a firearm.  Sampson was 
informed of this requirement during his plea colloquy and 
agreed that he was guilty of knowingly possessing a firearm 
as a felon. 
 
3 As another court of appeals recently wrote, see 
Palacios, 931 F.3d at 1315, even if Rehaif had set forth a new 
rule of constitutional law, it would need to be made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court.  See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663; see also Hoffner, 870 F.3d 
at 307 (“The Supreme Court itself must issue the retroactivity 
decision, either expressly or through a series of decisions.”).  
But, as we have indicated, the Supreme Court did not 
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 Because Sampson has not made the required prima 
facie showing that his claim rests on a new, retroactively 
applicable rule of constitutional law, we will deny his 
application to file a second or successive motion to vacate his 
sentence. 
 
announce any rule of constitutional law at all. 
